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SHOULD JUDGES CONVICT BASED ON 
THEIR SPECULATIONS OF GUILT? 
DORON MENASHE* & EYAL GRUNER** 
INTRODUCTION 
May the court resort to speculations of guilt? I.e., may it 
raise, of its own initiative, hypotheses not posed by the prosecution 
and not directly arising from the evidence? 
In the Zadorov case, Justice Amit adopts speculations of 
guilt to explain away the use of a serrated knife' and foreign shoe 
prints.2 Whereas in the view of Justice Danziger, on the other hand, 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa. 
Research Student, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa (2009-2013).
1 C.A. 7939/10 Zadorov v. State of Israel, at sec. 28-29 of Justice Amit's opinion 
(Dec. 23, 2015) (Isr.) ("Zadorov"). Serrated knife marks were found on the dece-
dent's chin, but all of the knives in the possession of the defendant, Zadorov, had a 
straight edge. According to his confession (later recanted), he worked with a 
retractable straight-edged utility knife (a "Japanese knife") and murdered her with 
the knife he worked with. Justice Amit speculated to reconcile these facts with the 
indictment: "Who can say with certainty that the appellant did not ultimately buy a 
cartridge with serrated blades for a retractable knife?" "Who can say with certainty 
that he did not use a grouting knife, which also has an interchangeable blade?" 
"Who can say with certainty that in the course of setting down and cutting the 
tiles, the appellant's blade did not scrape against something else, causing the blade 
to be altered, even ifjust a bit, into a serrated shape?" 
2 Id. In the Zadorov case, three bloody shoe prints were found in the bathroom 
stall in which the decedent was found: On the toilet seat, on the toilet tank and on 
the wall separating the second stall from the third stall. According to the evidence 
from prosecution witness Shor, all of these imprints came from the same type of 
shoe. These shoe prints did not match even one of the pairs of shoe given to Shor 
to examine, and they did not match Zadorov's shoes. Justice Amit raised specula-
tions to reconcile these facts with the indictment (Sec. 52 of his opinion): "The 
three foreign shoe prints may be explained by the chaos which was created once 
the body was discovered. Until the crime scene was properly sealed, various 
civilians, Magen David Adorn medics and police officers entered this small 
bathroom stall. List Tav/95 includes the name of fifteen people who are in the 
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it would seem that when dealing with criminal cases, speculative 
explanations of guilt should be inadmissible. 
In this review, we will address the legitimacy of resorting to 
hypothetical explanations (or "speculations") in order to fill in 
evidentiary gaps, i.e. situations in which the evidentiary picture is 
found lacking, and the court must determine, without specific 
evidence, what has occurred. Our analysis will focus on the filling of 
such gaps by the prosecution in criminal proceedings. 
We will distinguish between the general legitimacy of 
employing hypothetical explanations, on the one hand, and the 
discretion granted to accept, reject or give weight to these specific 
explanations, on the other hand. In this context, we will present four 
categories of evidence: Situations involving evidentiary gaps, situa-
tions of evidentiary obstruction, situations of evidentiary paradoxes 
and "speculations of power." We will discuss the question of how 
the court should rule when any such category of evidence exists. 
investigative material (testimony and statements) as those who entered the scene 
of the crime, but only ten of them were interviewed on these prints. The size of the 
bathroom stall does not leave room for more than one person, two at best, to 
squeeze into the stall, and during the re-creation. the investigator who accompa-
nied the appellant said spontaneously to the other police officers: 'There is no 
room for two people in this stall.' Who can say with certainty that with the chaos 
created, only those listed in List Tav/95 were present-a list that was compiled a 
month after the murder, relying on the names of people who appeared in the inves-
tigative material? Why were Police Officer Shoshan David, Patrol Officer Arik, 
Station Commander Reuven Arbel, the Chief of the Investigations Department and 
Forensics Officer Shaked not questioned again? In another statement taken from 
Paramedic Eyal Ben Moshe on 7 January 2007, he notes that he and his partner 
were asked to move as little as possible at the scene, but he was never asked if 
someone else had climbed or stood on the toilet or the tank. In his first statement, 
from the day of the incident, Eyal Ben Moshe notes that Officer Reuven, who was 
at the scene, requested that the decedent not be moved, because he and the driver 
had 'entered the scene and left two sets of yellow medical gloves in the waste-
basket in the bathroom, stepped in the area stained with blood and touched the 
body with our gloves ....' 
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I. THE LEGITIMACY OF TURNING TO 
SPECULATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
In our view, it is self-evident that relying on speculative or 
hypothetical explanations in criminal or civil proceedings is not 
illegitimate in principle. In practice, there is sometimes no other 
option. A lack of evidence is the paradigm in which the operation of 
inference is conducted, under conditions of uncertainty. Indeed, if 
there is one thing which may be stated with certainty regarding the 
establishment of facts in court on an evidentiary basis, it is that there 
can never be facts that are inferred from evidence with absolute 
certainty. The court cannot find facts by directly observing them, but 
rather, can only determine its findings about an event which has 
occurred in the past, an event for which the fact finders were not 
present, which they did not observe and which they naturally cannot 
recall. The court determines the facts in light of the impressions of 
witnesses and analysis of objective evidence, i.e. indirectly, all while 
the litigants (and, in particular, the defendant) have an interest in 
misleading it in order to advance their interests in achieving the 
legal results they seek. In keeping with John Locke's epistemologi-
cal classifications in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1690), the source of knowledge employed by the court is in moral 
proofs, i.e. second-hand reports of sensory evidence, without the fact 
finder absorbing the sensory evidence personally, or first-hand, but 
inferring by a range of evidence, some of which consists of reports 
by witnesses of what they observed first-hand. This is to be 
distinguished from direct sensory observation and from logical or 
mathematical deduction.4 
' DORON MENASHE, EYAL GRUNER, REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 41, 118 (Nebo, 2017). 
' Id. at 141-42; Barbara Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty: Theories of Knowledge 
andAnglo-AmericanJuries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 158 (1986-1987); 
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,book IV, ch. XVI 
(1690); N. SHOCHAT, The Moral and Legal Obligation to Protect the Innocent 
from False Conviction: A Critical and Analytical Examination of Normative and 
Procedural Obligations of the Legal System 262 (University of Haifa, Faculty of 
Law, 2015) (doctoral dissertation). 
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When presented with evidence that cannot produce certainty, 
the fact finder cannot employ epistemic justification in the strong 
sense, but only in the weak sense. Epistemic justification in the 
strong sense is epistemic justification which yields absolute certain-
ty in a conclusion, i.e. a conclusion beyond any doubt. However, 
such essential certainty is not realistic, and thus the only available 
justification in a situation of uncertainty is epistemic justification in 
the weak sense. Justification in the weak sense supports a conclu-
sion which is not certain but is strong enough to dispel skepticism. 
Justification in the weak sense supports a conclusion which is 
stronger than any other-the "most correct" conclusion as opposed 
to the "correct" conclusion-and it supports a conclusion which is 
stronger than the opposite conclusion or the negation of said conclu-
sion. Epistemic justification in the weak sense is not justification 
which creates certainty, but it does create theories which have vary-
ing levels of epistemic power, or varying levels of reasonability.5 
Therefore, the choice is to rely on epistemic justification in 
the weak sense, or to give up on epistemic justification altogether. 
Choosing the latter is inappropriate, as this all-or-nothing approach 
means either having epistemically-informative perfection or an utter 
rejection of any epistemic resource. This approach gives full weight 
to the minor possibility of error, and no weight at all to arguments 
which have even a small measure of uncertainty. If we refuse to 
accept any claim that is not certain, this means passing up the ability 
to prefer arguments if they are not certain. It is true that when there 
is no certainty the possibility of error grows, but why is that worse 
than the position of ignorance? If we arrive at the conclusion that we 
do not know, and therefore, there is no reason to prefer one option 
over another, this too presents a danger: Namely, that we will not 
take advantage of the partial, uncertain knowledge we do have, and 
that this information will be wasted, despite the fact that it is avail-
able. This approach rejects the partially epistemic situation- partial 
information which cannot create certainty, on the one hand, but 
which, on the other hand, is better than nothing. This rejection is 
senseless, as there is no justification to demand informative perfec-
' Menashe & Gruner, supranote 3, at 39-40. 
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tion as an absolute prerequisite for epistemic intellectual activity. 
There is no reason not to extract whatever we may from partial 
information, though it may be imperfect and incapable of generating 
certainty. Epistemic justification in the weak sense is an essential 
part of the explanatory-interpretive and intellectual activity of 
epistemic-probative discretion.6 
Moreover, ignoring justification in the weak sense means 
refusing to distinguish between a situation in which no good evi-
dence is available to buttress any argument, and a situation in which 
evidence is available but doubts remain. Assuming that it is indefen-
sible to equate these two situations and see no distinction between 
them requiring a different approach, we must find a way to take into 
account justifications in the weak sense.7 
Who may raise speculative explanations? 
In light of the abovementioned necessity of taking specula-
tive explanations into account, we believe that each side is allowed 
to raise them, all the more so when the proceedings are civil in 
nature, so that both the plaintiff and the defendant may use them. In 
our view, the intellectual endeavor of analyzing evidence under 
conditions of uncertainty needs to allow each side to raise hypothe-
ses which do not have a direct expression in the corpus of evidence, 
but which may be inferred, or to reconcile such hypotheses with the 
corpus of evidence, showing that it does not contradict the evidence. 
In civil proceedings, it is even clearer that this is correct, as the 
verdict itself is often "speculative," because the standard of proba-
bility is the absolute minimum above 50%. 
However, we believe that in criminal proceedings as well, 
both sides should be allowed raise speculative explanations. These 
arguments do not constitute evidence in their own right, but rather, 
analysis of the evidence. Meaning, either side of a criminal proceed-
ing may propose its own analysis of the corpus of evidence. The 
court is not required to accept this analysis and may certainly dis-
miss it, but in principle there is nothing preventing them from 
6 Id. at 40, 118. See also Doron Menashe, Further Thoughts on Ehud Olmert's 
Conviction in the Holyland Affair, ALEI ISHPAT 131 (2016).
7Menashe & Guner, supranote 3, at 40. 
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accepting the prosecution's analysis. In our view, no epistemic or 
normative considerations prevent accepting speculative hypotheses, 
even those offered by the prosecution, as long as these hypotheses 
are acceptable on their own terms. 
II. THE WEIGHT OF SPECULATIVE 
EXPLANATIONS 
Since we have established that it is legitimate to attempt to 
justify explanations and interpretations of evidentiary gaps, we 
should turn to the second question: The amount of weight to give to 
these explanations when they are offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal case. The explanations are required in this situation in light 
of the ostensible appearance of exculpatory evidence, or certain 
defects which may have arisen in the process of "producing" the 
prosecution's evidence.8 
In order to evaluate the appropriate weight for speculative expla-
nations, we propose splitting them into four categories 9 of evidence: 
A. Evidentiary gap; 
B. Evidentiary obstruction; 
C. Evidentiary paradox; and 
D. Speculations of power 
8 For example, situations such as taking statements, conducting a lineup or 
collecting and processing forensic evidence. 
9 We may say that every one of these categories of evidence represents a 
deviation, to whatever extent, from the norm, by which, if a crime is committed, 
the evidence will definitely indicate guilt and not innocence, though perhaps not at 
the level required for the court to accept it in a criminal case. This is due to the 
phenomenon of a crime leaving evidence of its commission, and this is in addition 
to the filtering of the prosecution, which indicts when it has sufficient evidence, in 
its view. On the other hand, acts do not always produce evidence that will suffice 
to establish the highest levels of probability, and therefore, a doubt remains that 
despite the evidence, these acts were not committed. 
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A. The Evidentiary Gap 
This would appear easy to decide. Evidentiary gap is a 
situation in which the evidence is ambiguous and does not point in a 
consistent direction. In this case, there is no need for speculations to 
explain the inconsistent evidence. Such a case demands acquittal, as 
the unequal consequences of risk of error demand that the burden be 
placed on the accuser. 
This was the situation in the Holyland affair, in which Ehud 
Olmert was charged with receiving bribes.10 On the one hand, there 
was no conclusive evidence proving the transfer of money from the 
prosecution witness to Yossi Olmert. The checks were not presented 
in court, nor the back accounts of Yossi Olmert or the prosecution's 
witness. There were no records of financial withdrawals or deposits 
from the witness to Yossi Olmert. 11 When a litigant decides not to 
present a certain piece of evidence which could illuminate a point, 
despite it being under his control and there being no justification for 
refusing to show it, we must infer that it is to his detriment. In the 
Holyland affair, the prosecution produced no such evidence and thus 
diminished the credibility of its position, relying on the testimony of 
the prosecution witness and Yossi Olmert's statement, which he 
recanted. This lack of evidence buttressed defendant Ehud Olmert's 
claim that he received no bribes or at least did not know about any 
funds being transferred from the prosecution witness to his brother 
Yossi Olmert, assuming that this crime took place. 12 When such 
anticipated evidence is lacking, the probability of guilt is lessened 
while the probability of innocence is increased. 
On the other hand, the lack of checks did not prove that no 
money was transferred, as this could have been done with cash or 
third-party checks. 13 
10 CrimA (TA) 5270/14 Olmert v State of Israel, PM (2014) (Isr.); see also 
Menashe, supra note 6 (providing a detailed critical analysis of the conviction in 
the Tel Aviv district court). 
" Menashe, supranote 6 at 128; Menashe & Gruner, supranote 3, at 198. 
12Menashe, supranote 6, at 129-30; Menashe & Gruner, supranote 3, at 198-99. 
13Menashe, supranote 6, at 131; Menashe & Gruner, supranote 3, at 199. 
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Even were we to assume that a check given to someone like 
Yossi Olmert would be immediately cashed, it could have been 
post-dated, meaning it would be usable only later; moreover, this 
assumes that the payer did not indicate that there was reason not to 
deposit it.
14 
Bank records are inconclusive in terms of establishing this 
payment by the witness. For bribery to be proven, it was enough for 
the checks to have been handed over, whether or not they were 
deposited. Moreover, evidence existed of the payment: The wit-
ness's testimony and the recipient's statement. This testimony was 
not negated, but doubt remained. 
15 
This is a situation of evidentiary gap, in which both guilt and 
innocence are reasonable. To wit, it is reasonable that Ehud Olmert 
never received a bribe and reasonable that he did. Evidence exists, 
on the one hand, that the payment was executed: Ehud Olmert never 
denied the factual basis, Yossi Olmert gave a statement that he 
received the checks, against his interest, and this matched the details 
given by the prosecution witness. 16 On the other hand, we have no 
factual data establishing the transfer of funds beyond a reasonable 
doubt. When evidence exists that this transaction took place, but 
other anticipated evidence is missing, both the thesis of guilt and the 
thesis of innocence are supportable based on the evidence. Such a 
case of evidentiary gap appears to demand an acquittal. 
17 
This situation arises when supporting or reliable evidence 
exists on both sides of the equation, for both guilt and innocence. 
The evidentiary picture is thoroughly inconsistent and does not 
convincingly make the case for guilt or innocence. In such a situa-
tion, speculations of guilt should not form the basis of conviction, 
because evidence which points to innocence should not be unintui-
tively reconciled in some way with the guilt hypothesis. This would 
be 'begging the question' of when the evidentiary gap disallows 
such a presumption. Thus, in the Holyland affair, just as the court 
could not adopt the defense's view that the production of the checks 
14 Menashe, supranote 6, at 132; Menashe & Gruner, supranote 3. 
15 Menashe, supranote 6, at 133. 
16 Menashe, supranote 6, at 133-34; Menashe & Gruner, supranote 3. 
17 Menashe, supranote 6, at 134. 
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had not been proven, such that the prosecution's argument should be 
rejected (speculation of innocence), it similarly could not be inferred 
that the existing evidence of this payment should lead the court to 
ignore the missing evidence (speculation of guilt). 18 In this case, the 
evidence was ambiguous, and this should have been to the prosecu-
tion's detriment, and the defense's benefit. 19 
B. Evidentiary Obstruction 
In such cases, the incriminating evidence is very strong and 
consistent, so that the crushing weight of probability (to the extent 
that it would insult common sense to ignore it) demands rejecting 
any hypothesis of innocence.2 ° 
If the incriminating evidence is so powerful, as in this situa-
tion, then the evidence which does not indicate guilt creates an 
evidentiary gap, which may be explained reasonably. 
In a situation of evidentiary obstruction, it is justified to 
adopt a speculative explanation to reject any hypothesis of inno-
cence based on evidence which does not indicate guilt. This is 
justified by the fact that at this stage, a hypothesis of innocence is of 
negligible worth in terms of probability. In this situation, every 
reasonable hypothesis which could explain the evidentiary gap is 
coherent with the overwhelming probabilistic accumulation of incri-
minating evidence from the prosecution. If we reach the conclusion 
that the power of incriminating evidence is so high, this means any 
hypothesis of innocence has a corresponding drop in probability, 
even approaching zero. In this case, naturally, the speculations for 
evidentiary gap fit with guilt, and they are an inherent part of the 
epistemic logic of the verdict. 
In a situation of evidentiary obstruction, speculations of guilt 
are justified because of the conclusion the court has already reached: 
The incriminating evidence is so overwhelming, probabilistically, 
18]d 
19 
-1d. at 135. 
2' For example, a gambler in a casino may play a game in which the chances of 
winning are negligible; if he wins turn after turn, it is an insult to common sense to 
claim that "circumstantially" he is simply having a run of good luck. 
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that it would be an insult to common sense to question it. As 
opposed to the evidence for acquittal, which is correspondingly 
underwhelming. In such a case, it makes sense to explain exculpa-
tory evidence in a way consistent with guilt, even speculatively, 
because we have already reached the conclusion that the incrimina-
ting evidence is overwhelming, notwithstanding the exculpatory 
evidence. The presumption of the overwhelming incriminating 
power is not 'begging the question,' because it is inferred prior to 
this point by analyzing the corpus of evidence. In this case, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the defendant is guilty. Therefore, if 
there is a speculative way to explain the exculpatory evidence to fit 
with guilt, this conforms to the presumption of guilt due to the 
overwhelming incriminating evidence. Moreover, the fact that the 
exculpatory evidence can be explained away speculatively means 
that the exculpatory evidence is underwhelming; overwhelming evi-
dence could not be explained away, even speculatively. In this case, 
conviction is justified because of the overwhelming incriminating 
evidence, creating a presumption that every item of exculpatory 
evidence which may fit with guilt speculatively does not contradict 
guilt; and indeed, in practice, all of the exculpatory evidence may be 
reconciled with guilt in a speculative manner. 
C. Evidentiary Paradox 
Evidentiary paradox is a situation in which the incriminating 
evidence is very strong, such as in the situation of evidentiary 
obstruction; however, the evidence which does not fit with guilt 
generates an evidentiary gap which cannot be reasonably explained, 
so that any attempt to explain it is obstructed by the lack of feasible 
probability. 
In a case of evidentiary paradox, we have, on the one hand, 
incriminating evidence which ostensibly leaves any hypothesis of 
innocence with a negligible probability; on the other hand, any 
attempt to explain the evidentiary gap also appears to be negligibly 
reasonable, so that it, too, runs into evidentiary obstruction. In other 
words, the probability of innocence in light of the incriminating 
evidence is tiny, but so is the probability of guilt in light of the other 
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evidence. This indicates a lack of sufficient information to resolve 
the paradox. If we cannot locate such information, we remain with 
an evidentiary paradox. This would ostensibly lead to acquittal; just 
as evidentiary ambiguity leads to acquittal. 
In this situation, both the incriminating and the exculpatory 
evidence is overwhelming. There is just a mutual evidentiary 
obstruction, for guilt and for innocence. In such a situation, it is 
impossible to make the exculpatory evidence fit with guilt, even 
speculatively. Any such attempt would insult common sense. Thus, 
evidentiary paradox leads to acquittal. 
A question arises: What does it mean to be incapable of 
giving a speculative explanation of exculpatory evidence? A classic 
example is that we cannot propose a hypothesis with empirical and 
logical support which allows this exculpatory evidence to exist at 
the same time that the defendant has in fact committed the crime. 
This is a prerequisite for the evidentiary paradox, but is it sufficient? 
We think not: There may be cases in which we cannot understand 
the logic, but there is still support for the existence of such logic 
(though we cannot comprehend it, at least at the moment). 
For an instance of logic existing, though we do not grasp it, 
consider the stage magician who saws someone in half, apparently. 
The audience knows this is an illusion, even though it cannot 
explain the mechanism of the trick. There is a logical basis which 
allows us the presumption that we are seeing things, as it were. On 
the other hand, if a human being were bisected under laboratory 
conditions, the observers would not presume some logical mechan-
ism beyond their understanding, but rather that people are indeed 
being split in two. 
Therefore, not all unexplainable exculpatory evidence 
creates an evidentiary paradox. If we have a logical basis, we may 
presume a logical explanation which is, at the moment, beyond our 
comprehension. An evidentiary paradox exists only when we have 
no logical basis to assume a reasonable explanation for the excul-
patory evidence despite the defendant's guilt. 
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Let us demonstrate this with the Zadorov case.21 Imagine 
there was a camera at the murder scene recording, and we could 
watch Zadorov committing the murder. The foreign shoe prints, in 
such an instance, would not be exculpatory evidence creating an 
evidentiary paradox, and the hypothesis would be justified. This is 
based on the assumption that the foreign shoe prints do not have the 
same epistemic weight as watching a video recording. These shoe 
prints may be explained, though with some difficulty, as fitting with 
guilt; a video recording cannot be explained away. However, if there 
were two cameras, one showing Zadorov committing the murder 
and one showing someone else committing the murder, this would 
be sufficient to create an evidentiary paradox. Even if the foreign 
shoe prints are strongly exculpatory, we can conceive of a logical 
mechanism to make them fit with guilt. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to imagine such a mechanism for the video recording, as 
long as we could be sure that the footage had not been falsified or 
manufactured. 
D. Justice Danziger's Approach to Speculative 
Hypotheses in the Zadorov Case 
Let us consider the Zadorov case, in which Justice Danziger 
dismisses speculations of guilt which Justice Amit proposes for 
exculpatory evidence. In the first instance, these address the fact that 
wounds on the decedent's chin indicate that the murder weapon was 
serrated; 22 in the second, these address the foreign shoe prints found 
in the bathroom stall.23 
The justification for speculations of guilt is based on the 
question of whether the incriminating evidence in the Zadorov case 
creates an overwhelming probability of guilt, so that it would be an 
insult to common sense to claim that he is not the murderer. If the 
answer is negative, then there is an "evidentiary gap" much like in 
21 See supranote 2. 
22 See Zadorov, supranote 1. 
23 See supranote 2. 
2017-2019 Should Judges Convict 
the Holyland affair, and thus, in light of the exculpatory evidence, 
he should not be convicted by relying on speculations of guilt. 
However, if the answer is affirmative and overwhelming 
incriminating evidence exists, this creates a situation of evidentiary 
obstruction, and it is justified to examine speculations of guilt which 
would make Zadorov guilty despite the exculpatory evidence. The 
question is what the probabilistic picture of the exculpatory evidence 
looks like. 
In a case of evidentiary obstruction, if the exculpatory evi-
dence is not probabilistically overwhelming (as opposed to the incri-
minating evidence), conviction is justified based on speculations of 
guilt to resolve the issues of the serrated knife wounds and the 
foreign shoe prints. If there is a possibility of raising a speculation 
which does not insult common sense according to which these 
issues can be reconciled with Zadorov's guilt, he may be convicted 
on the basis of these speculations of guilt. 
However, if we face an evidentiary paradox, in which the 
exculpatory evidence is just as probabilistically overwhelming as the 
incriminating evidence, then there is no justification for convicting 
Zadorov on the basis of speculations of guilt such as Justice Amit 
offers for the knife wounds and the shoe prints. In this situation, 
such speculations of guilt are inadmissible, as they would insult 
common sense. This is an evidentiary paradox requiring Zadorov's 
acquittal. 
In the Zadorov case, Justice Danziger rejects the specula-
tions of guilt by Justice Amit: 
"In my view, we are talking about speculations 
which have no basis in the evidence, defying clearly 
objective proof which does not fit with the confess-
ions. 4 
"In this context, I must warn-as regards this case 
and criminal cases, however they may be-against 
raising hypotheses to the detriment of the defendant, 
24 See Zadorov, supranote 1. 
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with the aim of filling an evidentiary "gap" or to 
explain some question or other which arises from the 
corpus of evidence. Naturally, I do not say this every 
time an evidentiary "hole" opens, as this would mean 
automatic acquittal. It is clear that there will be cases 
in which logic, common sense or the corpus of 
evidence will demand and require that this gap be 
filled. Of course, we do not seek that the conviction 
be based on a full and complete picture of the com-
mission of the crime. In almost every criminal case, 
there are gaps and open questions, even when guilt 
has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt. 
Nevertheless, I see that it is worth emphasizing that 
closing holes, questions or gaps which arise from the 
corpus of evidence, in a way which works to the 
detriment of the defendant, must be done with the 
utmost caution. In my view, the judge must deal with 
a "crack" in the corpus of evidence before him and 
ask himself if the explanation at issue has a true 
logical basis and some foundation in the evidence, or 
if perhaps we are talking about a simple presumption 
which ultimately leads to inferring things by 'beg-
ging the question.' It appears that this is further rein-
forced when these hypotheses and explanations are 
those which the prosecution has never raised.25 
"This is the place to note that my colleague reckons 
the failure to interrogate the appellant about his 
knives to the detriment of the defense, but he does 
not consider the fact that the respondent did not see 
any need to interrogate the appellant about this issue, 
even though the matter of the knife blade was 
already a matter of dispute in the "first go-round" in 
the district court (in the context of Peleg's opinion). 
It remains to note that the burden of proving guilt is 
25Id. at 205. 
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upon the respondent, and we should not turn things 
topsy-turvy in this regard.26 
"Indeed, this is not proof, but a guess or hypothesis. 
As for logic, it is a matter of debate as to what extent 
we may venture forth into the realms of logic without 
any true evidentiary foundation, when we are talking 
about criminal law.",2
7 
Justice Danziger acquitted Zadorov, justifying it thusly: 
"I will stress that we are talking about a borderline 
case, a "step" away from conviction, as stated. The 
possibility that the appellant was convicted as a 
blameless man requires a concatenation of unlikely 
circumstances. In other words, the probability that 
the appellant is innocent is not very high. Neverthe-
less, under these circumstances, in my view, we can-
not suffice to let the conviction stand. Even though 
the corpus of evidence ties the appellant to the 
commission of the murder quite intimately, as stated, 
we cannot "round down" the doubts which arise and 
surface from it, which must be reckoned to his 
28 benefit., 
With all due respect, we believe that Justice Danziger's 
reasons for rejecting Justice Amit's speculation and his support for 
acquitting Zadorov do not stand up to critical analysis. Let use 
examine them individually. 
261d. at 204.271d. at 360.21Jd.at 354. 
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1. Anchoring the Explanation of the Evi-
dentiary Gap in the Corpus of Evidence 
in a Concrete and Direct Way 
Justice Danziger is ready to accept explanations for holes 
and gaps as long as they are not speculative, i.e. as long as they are 
anchored in the corpus of evidence. However, Justice Danziger 
means this in the narrow sense, i.e. that the corpus of evidence must 
directly and concretely support the specific explanation proposed. If 
the explanation is that Zadorov disposed of his serrated knives after 
the murder, then the corpus of evidence must support, concretely 
and directly, that Zadorov disposed of the knives. If the foreign shoe 
prints are explained by saying that one of the first responders 
entered the stall and left them, then the corpus of evidence must 
directly and concretely support this contention. 
We demur and believe that this requirement should be 
understood in the broad sense: Not just concrete and direct support 
of the proposed explanation, but speculative and indirect support as 
well. Even if the evidentiary material does not directly and con-
cretely support the contention that Zadorov threw away the knives 
or that one of the first responders entered the stall, if the incrimi-
nating evidence is so strong and overwhelming and the exculpatory 
evidence is not, then we have a situation of "evidentiary obstruc-
tion" and therefore one may explain the exculpatory evidence in 
such a way that fits with guilt; and if we cannot explain the entirety 
of the incriminating evidence in such a way that fits with innocence, 
then in the broader and indirect sense, the corpus of evidence 
supports speculations of guilt. 
Justice Danziger does not distinguish between a situation in 
which the incriminating evidence is overwhelming and the excul-
patory evidence is underwhelming (a situation of evidentiary 
obstruction) and its converse; therefore, in a sweeping manner, he 
negates speculations of guilt. Such a sweeping rejection, we believe, 
is inappropriate. It creates a lack of coherence when we already have 
a conclusion according to which the incriminating evidence is 
overwhelming yet refuse to interpret exculpatory evidence in light of 
this conclusion which already exists and is very well-founded. 
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Speculations of guilt may be justified in light of a well-founded 
conclusion which the court has already arrived at concerning the 
overwhelming probability of the incriminating evidence, i.e. a 
conclusion of evidentiary obstruction. 
2. Begging the Question 
Justice Danziger negates the speculations of guilt due to the 
reason of 'begging the question.' However, we should take into 
account that if the conclusion concerning the overwhelming proba-
bility of incriminating evidence and the lack of overwhelming 
probability of the exculpatory evidence has a proper foundation, i.e. 
if we have a situation of evidentiary obstruction, then we do not 
have a case of 'begging the question,' but rather, a well-founded 
presumption. 
3. Burden of Proof on the Prosecution 
Justice Danziger determines that the prosecution did not 
interrogate Zadorov about his knives, when the burden of proof was 
on its shoulders. Indeed, the burden of proof is on the prosecution. 
However, aside from the burden of proof, there is also a burden of 
presenting evidence or burden of interpretation, and this burden is 
likely to be borne by the defendant. The situation may arise in which 
the prosecution has met the burden by presenting incriminating 
evidence which is probabilistically overwhelming, while the excul-
patory evidence is not. This is "evidentiary obstruction." If the 
prosecution succeeds in showing that the corpus of evidence creates 
evidentiary obstruction, then the burden of presenting proof or the 
burden of interpretation passes to the defendant to show that despite 
the overwhelming probability of the incriminating evidence, the 
exculpatory evidence cannot be reconciled with guilt. If the defen-
dant neglects to do so, consistency demands the conclusion emer-
ging from the fact that the prosecution has already proven the over-
whelming power of the incriminating evidence and the underwhelm-
ing power of the exculpatory evidence. The necessary conclusion is 
that, with a lack of explanation, the exculpatory evidence does not 
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fit with guilt. This explanation must be provided by the defendant, 
because the prosecution cannot know how to explain a claim of 
innocence to which it is not a party. 
To summarize, Justice Danziger sets out three conditions for 
explaining evidentiary holes: (1) Concrete and direct anchoring of 
the explanations of evidentiary holes; (2) a lack of 'begging the 
question' in these explanations; (3) maintaining the burden of proof 
on the prosecution. This means that Justice Danziger does not distin-
guish between a situation in which the incriminating evidence is 
probabilistically overwhelming and the exculpatory evidence is not 
(evidentiary obstruction) and a situation in which this is not the case 
(evidentiary paradox or evidentiary gap). This is a mistake, because 
such a distinction is critical for the legitimacy of the conviction in 
light of speculations. 
4. Justifying the Acquittal Due to Excul-
patory Evidence Despite a Distant 
Possibility of Innocence 
To justify the acquittal, Justice Danziger determines that the 
power of incriminating evidence creates a situation which is a step 
away from conviction-despite that for Zadorov to be innocent 
would require a concatenation of unlikely circumstances. 
This is wrong, as an evidentiary situation in which the possi-
bility of innocence is "a concatenation of unlikely circumstances" is 
likely to fit with evidentiary obstruction, i.e. when the incriminating 
evidence is probabilistically overwhelming but the exculpatory 
evidence is not. Justice Danziger does not explain why despite the 
fact that the possibility of innocence requires a concatenation of 
unlikely circumstances, nevertheless the incriminating evidence is 
not so probabilistically overwhelming as to prevent the defendant 
from offering an explanation of his innocence which is not an insult 
to common sense (i.e. a situation of evidentiary gap). Perhaps the 
power of the exculpatory evidence is such that, alongside the over-
whelming incriminating evidence, it would still not be an insult to 
common sense to raise a hypothesis of innocence (i.e. a situation of 
evidentiary paradox)? Without such a reason, as stated, there is not 
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sufficient foundation to justify ignoring the power of incriminating 
evidence and grasp only the exculpatory evidence. 
Moreover, it appears that Justice Danziger bases the acquit-
tal on the very fact that exculpatory evidence exists, without relying 
on the power of the incriminating evidence. With all due respect, we 
find this approach wholly in error. Based on this, we would have to 
say that to convict a defendant, there could not be any exculpatory 
evident which cannot be directly and concretely disproven. This 
approach ignores the question of how compelling the incriminating 
evidence is and how compelling the exculpatory evidence is (or is 
not). In other words, Justice Danziger assumes only the possibility 
of an evidentiary gap, and does not examine the possibility of 
evidentiary obstruction or evidentiary paradox. If the incriminating 
evidence is compelling, but not the exculpatory evidence (i.e. evi-
dentiary obstruction), it would create a lack of coherence were we to 
justify acquittal in every situation in which exculpatory evidence 
appears without concrete, direct support but with indirect, general 
support from the entirety of the corpus of evidence. If nevertheless 
the exculpatory evidence can fit with guilt in a speculative way, this 
means that we have a consistent epistemic picture. The speculative 
resolution of the exculpatory evidence with guilt epistemically dove-
tails with the conclusion already well-founded concerning the over-
whelming incriminating evidence. 
From what is stated above, it arises that Justice Danziger's 
acquittal in the Zadorov case cannot withstand criticism, as long as 
there is no basis provided for the probabilistically overwhelming 
power of the exculpatory evidence (evidentiary paradox) or the 
probabilistically overwhelming power of the incriminating evidence 
is not undermined (evidentiary gap). As stated, Justice Danziger 
does not present such a basis. 
III. "SPECULATIONS OF POWER" 
The fourth category of evidence we propose is "speculations 
of power." In this situation, the court must determine among various 
low-probability events, one of which, logic dictates, must have taken 
place. 
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These are situations in which every possible event is uncom-
mon. When every event is rare, one of them still must be the correct 
option. In this situation, it is incorrect to discount an unlikely possi-
bility because of its unlikeliness, since every alternative is unlikely 
as well. 
Thus, if the event indicating guilt is unlikely, as is the event 
indicating innocence, then in a relative sense, neither can be rejected 
because of its unlikeliness. It is clear that in this situation, the correct 
and true possibility is an uncommon one, and thus choosing one 
unlikely alternative over another cannot be a justification or consi-
deration. Below, we will present two situations of speculations of 
power: One of suppressed memories, and the other from the Nissim 
Haddad affair. 
IV. SPECULATIONS OF POWER IN SUPPRESSED 
MEMORIES 
The issue of suppressed memories arises, for example, in a 
case in which a father is accused of raping his daughter, who 
recovers these memories long after the alleged events, due to a 
psychological process called dissociative amnesia (commonly 
referred to as suppressed memories): 29 The rapes were not forgotten, 
but rather suppressed and inaccessible in the subconscious, as a 
defense mechanism against the traumatic event. Only with the 
passage of time from the event or due to certain other triggering 
events would these memories come to the surface of the conscious 
29 Dissociative amnesia is the scientific terms for suppressed memories, as 
described by Eli Zomer in his lecture, "Suppressed Memories: Science, Law and 
Society" at a symposium at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. SomerClinic, 
Suppressed Memories: Science, Law and Society, YouTUBE (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2168JXUi6fM. 
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mind as "recovered memories."3 ° The entire process is sometimes 
,known as "recovering suppressed memories. 
' 31 
The possible events in light of the complainant's claim are 
the following: 
1) She is telling the truth; the rapes occurred and dissociative 
amnesia caused her to forget it until the memories were 
eventually recovered. The recovered suppressed memories 
2are accurate 
2) The memory is honest but false; the complainant believes 
what she is saying, but these rapes never occurred, and these 
are false memories. They could be the product of suggesti-
bility (implanted memories-e.g. the therapist might have 
explained her behavior as indicating sexual assault, causing 
the complainant to believe this incorrectly) or auto-suggesti-
bility (i.e. the complainant herself came up with the idea of 
sexual assault and convinced herself) 3 
3) This is a false complaint. The complainant knows that no 
rapes occurred, but she wants to slander her father for 
another motive, e.g. revenge or extortion. 4 
A priori, the probability of each of the three events is low: It 
is unlikely that a father would rape his daughter, it is unlikely that 
events which never occurred would be implanted in the complain-
ant's mind, and it is unlikely that the daughter would fabricate a tale 
of incestuous rape out of whole cloth. 
30 Limor Etzioni, Re: Crim. App. 5582109, Anonymous v State of Israel, Con-
cerning the Question ofSuppressedMemories in IsraeliLaw, ALEI MISHPAT 479, 
482-90. 
3 A statement of opinion on the scientific status of suppressed and recovered 
memories, 12.10.2014, available at https://www.haaretz.co.il/st/inter/Hheb/images 
/gilui.pdf.
32 Etzioni, supranote 29.33Id. at 490-95; Statement of Opinion, supranote 30. 
3' Doron Menashe, Liran Ohayon, "The Unconsidered Hypothesis: Lying about 
Sexual Assault Based on Suppressed Memories," Dynameet: The Doctoral Blog 
of the Faculty of Law, University of Haifa (23.10.2014). 
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Nevertheless, these are the only options. One of these must 
be true, so the unlikeliness of any is irrelevant, as all the other alter-
natives are rare. Each offsets the other. In such a situation of 
unlikely speculations of guilt (all the more so with unlikely specula-
tions of innocence), rarity is not a sufficient reason to dismiss them. 
V. FALSE COMPLAINT: HOW RARE IS IT? 
We should note that false complaints are rare, particularly 
those expressed by a daughter against her father. Unlike the spousal 
relationship, the parental relationship involves biological-evolution-
ary "attachment" which deters a child from slandering a parent. 
Despite this, we should not exaggerate how uncommon the phe-
nomenon is when it comes to suppressed memories, for the 
following reasons: 
35 
First of all, a priori, this is a low-probability event, but this is 
not the probability we must examine. Rather, we must consider the 
likelihood of falsehood once such a complaint has been introduced. 
When we consider the relevant conditional probabilities (given the 
claim about these serious crimes) in a comparative manner, a very 
small percentage of those who are lying may prefer to hang on to the 
suppressed memories argument so as not to encourage questions 
about testimony concealed for so many years. 
Second, if there is no price to pay for false complaints, such 
a regime emboldens not only true complaints but false ones as well. 
It may very well be that as a result, the victim's complaint and testi-
mony are rendered powerless in criminal jurisprudence; in other 
words, the reasonability of accepting such a complaint will be more 
or less equal whether we assume the event happened or not. 
Third, if the judicial process is limited in its ability to iden-
tify authentic emotional distress, and the possibility exists of a false 
positive in which the court may determine facts in error, the deter-
rence for false complaints is reduced. 
Fourth, the more the court uses common-sense considera-
tions to determine the veracity of a complaint, the more the com-
35id. 
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plainant can prepare herself for her testimony and present herself as 
a true victim, so that the court may be utterly unable to discern any 
duplicity on her part. 
Fifth, the more the defendant acts towards the complainant 
in a manner which is violent or inflicts suffering, but does not estab-
lish the fundamental elements of the crime, the greater is the motive 
for revenge on her part. 
VI. THE NISSIM HADDAD AFFAIR 
In this affair,36 the appellant was successful in appealing his 
conviction in district court of sodomizing a minor relative (under 
age fourteen) and aggravated assault. The evidence showed that an 
eighteen-month-old had been left alone for a certain amount of time 
with his mother's boyfriend in the gym of their building; the mother 
reported that when the toddler came back, he was suffering from 
two anal tears.37 
This event is an extremely rare one; expert witnesses said 
they had never encountered one. Nevertheless, the prosecution 
presented cases of even younger children being assaulted. 38 
The exculpatory alternative is that because the toddler was 
taking iron supplements which caused constipation, he developed 
anal fissures. These fissures started bleeding in the gym, and a finger 
inserted anally caused the fissures to become tears.39 This too would 
be a rare event. Though sodomizing a toddler is uncommon but not 
unknown, a fissure developing into a tear due to the insertion of a 
finger is an event which the defense could not present one example 
of in medical history. Moreover, since anal fissures among young 
children are quite common, more cases of these fissures becoming 
tears due to the insertion of a finger would be expected.4° 
The incriminating event (sodomizing a toddler) is uncom-
mon and the exculpatory event (an anal fissure becoming a tear by 
36 C.A. 2967/14 Nissim Haddad v. State of Israel, 2016. 
37Id. at3. 
381Id. at 36, 96. 
3 9 
_d. at 98. 
4 1d. at 101. 
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the insertion of a finger) is uncommon; however, logic dictates one 
of them must have happened, as no one denies the toddler's wounds, 
nor does anyone suggest a third event. Each of the events is rare in 
terms of unconditional a priori probability, but not rare as a matter 
of conditional a priori probability-the probability conditioned on 
this specific corpus of evidence. In this situation, one cannot invali-
date the speculations of guilt due to statistical rarity, since this is 
offset by the rarity of the sole alternative, the exculpatory event. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have examined whether it is justified for 
the court to raise speculations of guilt in its criminal rulings. We 
have shown that this is legitimate in principle because of the uncer-
tainty inherent in a given corpus of evidence. 
We have mainly dealt with the weight of speculative expla-
nations in different situations, a typology of four categories of 
evidence. 
1) Evidentiary Gap: A situation in which both the incriminating 
event and the exculpatory event are reasonable, the evidence 
for each does not create an obstruction, and thus it is unjus-
tified to convict based on speculations of guilt. 
2) Evidentiary Obstruction: A situation in which the incrimina-
ting evidence is probabilistically overwhelming, but the excul-
patory evidence is not. In such a situation, conviction is 
demanded based on speculations of guilt as long as these do 
not insult common sense. Conviction based on speculations of 
guilt is appropriate whether the logic to make the exculpatory 
evidence consistent with the guilt hypothesis is inferable, or 
whether even it's the existence of said logic is inferable, even 
if the fact finders cannot identify it. 
3) Evidentiary Paradox: Both the exculpatory and the incrimina-
ting evidence are probabilistically overwhelming. In this case, 
conviction based on speculations of guilt is inappropriate. 
4) Speculations of Power: A case in which both the incriminating 
event and the exculpatory event are uncommon, but logic 
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dictates that one of them must have occurred. Based on uncon-
ditional a priori probability, both events are rare, so they offset 
such other, and neither can be discounted because of its rarity. 
In principle, the court may convict based on speculations of 
guilt in this case, as long as it takes into consideration other 
exculpatory elements. 
We believe that this typology is important to determine the 
considerations of guilt or innocence in general, and the weight to be 
ascribed to speculations of guilt in particular. 

